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Abstract
This work contains three essays on empirical pricing. In the rst essay, I propose to
re-examine the evidence on mutual fund managers' illiquidity and volatility timing
ability by using a holdings-based approach, which is free from the articial timing
bias occurred in the traditional return-based timing method. Through testing the
timing evidence by the holdings approach, I am able to know to what degree the
results in the literature are biased by no-information reasons. In the second essay,
I investigate mutual fund managers' skills from their reactions to the observable
market condition, which is a relatively overlooked dimension in the literature. I
propose to distinguish managers' economic motives form their reaction behavior
to the public market illiquidity and volatility condition, which brings us new in-
sight into how managers' private incentive aects their investment behaviors. In
the third essay, I try to solve the idiosyncratically puzzle in the literature. I show
that equity duration plays as a multiple of discount rate news shock and, therefore,
aects equity return volatility. I show that the trend of the implied market dura-
tion is consistent with the trend of market idiosyncratic volatility as addressed in
Campbell et al. (2001).
vii
Chapter 1
Introduction
This work contains three essays on empirical pricing. In the rst essay, I propose to
re-examine the evidence on mutual fund managers' illiquidity and volatility timing
ability by using a holdings-based approach.
The rapid growth of mutual fund market since 1980s has shown people's belief
in sophisticated investors' ability to exploit market conditions. Whether fund man-
agers can allocate assets more eciently than naive investors thus attracts great
academic interest. To evaluate managers' skills to exploit information about future
market condition, also known as timing abilities, the leading research Treynor and
Mazuy (1966) propose a return-based regression model. The idea is to capture the
non-linear relationship between portfolio returns and market returns as the proxy
for manager's operating of portfolio exposure. This study initiate a stream of re-
searches exploring managers' timing ability (for example, Henriksson and Merton
(1981), Becker et al. (1999), and Jiang (2003)).
However, the timing evidences of these return-based researches could be biased
when the non-linearity is due to non-information-based strategy. Such strategies as
option holding or dynamic trading naturally create a signicant interaction term
in a return regression, which results in a false timing (articial timing) problem.
These aforementioned issues naturally cast doubt on past liquidity and volatility
timing evidence. It is important to know whether the conclusions still hold after
correcting these biases.
In the late 1990s, a holding-based alternative timing measure becomes feasible
when managers' holdings data becomes available. Through observing managers'
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portfolio holdings, it is easily to examine whether managers adjust their portfolio
exposures based on their forecast for market conditions. Most importantly, the
holding-based method uses only ex ante holding information on portfolio formation
and therefore does not biased by the non-information-based return non-linearity
occurred during a holding period.
In the rst essay, I propose to re-examine liquidity/volatility timing evidences
through a holding-based approach. I investigate whether managers utilize liquid-
ity/volatility information to adjust their portfolio. I try to answer to what extent
the articial timing problem biases our knowledge of liquidity/volatility timing.
The second essay focuses on how managers' illiquidity/volatility reactions reect
their private incentives and how the reactions predict future fund performance. At
rst thought, no relation should be expected since public information to which
fund managers react cannot generate any rent to funds. However, managers could
react very dierently to the market condition based on their perspectives. A fund
manager could take actions that are consistent with the rational risk-averse models
because of his rigorous training. However, he could also do so for the lack of skills.
Similarly, a manager could increase risk exposure during market turmoil to explore
his private information, or to maximize his personal benet, which is known for as
the agency problem. It is not clear what kind of reaction reect managers' skills
and add value to funds, and the performance consequences of managers' reactions
are still unanswered in the literature.
I propose to construct new reaction measures by using the mutual fund holding
data, which provides us direct information about managers' optimal asset alloca-
tion. The new measure contains forward-looking information and, therefore, better
captures managers' investment decision.
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The third essay try to solve the idiosyncratically puzzle in the literature. Camp-
bell et al. (2001) documented a signicant positive slope idiosyncratic volatility
trend from 1962 to 1997, whereas the aggregate market volatility seems to be con-
stant during this period. This puzzling result initiates a stream of active asset
pricing studies trying to explain the upward trend. Some of the studies explore
the phenomena from the perspective of investor composition. Other studies put
their emphasis on the angle of fundamental changes. While these studies provide
dierent angles to explore the dynamic of market idiosyncratic volatility, most of
them fail to explain the downward idiosyncratic volatility trend after year 2000.
I propose a new explanation based on the cash ow horizon of stocks for to the
idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. I demonstrate that stock volatility can be viewed
as a function of equity duration. The implied equity duration plays a role as a
multiple, whose change amplies the shock of discount rate. I consider the dynamic
of stock duration as an alternative explanation for the upward trend through late
1990s. Moreover, market equity duration explains the ups and downs of market
idiosyncratic volatility after year 2000. Given the positive relationship between
equity duration and market volatility, I further investigate whether market equity
duration is associated with positive market returns. I complement the literature
by showing a time-series relationship between the aggregate market duration and
the market risk premium.
3
Chapter 2
Illiquidity and Volatility Timings of
Mutual Fund Managers: Holding Based
Evidence
2.1 Introduction
The rapid growth of mutual fund market since 1980s has shown people's belief in
sophisticated investors' ability to exploit market conditions. Whether fund man-
agers can allocate assets more eciently than naive investors thus attracts great
academic interest. To evaluate managers' skills to exploit information about fu-
ture market condition, also known as timing abilities, the leading research Treynor
and Mazuy (1966) propose a return-based regression model. They measure the
non-linear relationship between portfolio returns and market returns as the proxy
for manager's operating of portfolio exposure. This research initiates a stream of
literature discussing managers' ability to time market returns (see Henriksson and
Merton (1981), Becker et al. (1999), and Jiang (2003)), market liquidity (see Cao
et al. (2013a), Cao et al. (2013b)), and market volatility (see Busse (1999)) under
similar return-based framework.
However, the timing evidences of these return-based researches could be biased
when the non-linearity is due to non-information-based strategy. Such strategies
as option holding or dynamic trading naturally create a signicant interaction
term in a return regression, which results in a false timing (articial timing) prob-
lem. Traditional return-based liquidity/volatility timing researches in the literature
use regressions with interaction terms between market returns and market liquid-
ity/volatility to capture managers' timing ability. Therefore, any non-information-
based strategy that could induce such a non-linearity would be identied as false
liquidity/volatility timing. For instance, the well-documented interim trading prob-
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lem, which means the frequency of evaluating a fund's performance is lower than a
manager's trading frequency. In this case, even though managers react to market
change after observing the market conditions, the low frequency return evaluation
would not be able to distinguish between the ex anti prediction or ex post reaction
of the manager and thus identify false timing. The interim trading problem has
been widely discussed in the mutual fund literature (see Fama (1972), Jagannathan
and Korajczyk (1986), Goetzmann et al. (2000), Ferson and Khang (2002), Ferson
et al. (2006), and Ferson and Tucker (2006).
Another means of false timing is option holding. For instance, a manager could
hold an index option in his portfolio, which earns a high return in the bull market
due to large underlying appreciation. At the same time, the appreciation of the
underlying market attracts more investors and thus results in a more liquid option.
Option increases as the liquidity increases due to the decrease of required return
or due to the increase of option demand. The price appreciation that is due to
above channel exactly replicates a positive interaction eect. Specically, the op-
tion price increase given an underlying return is larger when simultaneous market
liquidity is higher. This non-linearity between portfolio returns and market returns
under dierent liquidity level is formed mechanically and has nothing to do with
managers' timing ability.
These aforementioned issues naturally cast doubt on past liquidity and volatility
timing evidence. It is important to know whether the conclusions still hold after
correcting these biases. With the increase of data availability a holding-based al-
ternative timing measure becomes feasible after the late 1990s. Through observing
managers' portfolio holding data, it is easily to examine whether managers ad-
just their portfolio exposures based on their forecast for market conditions. The
holding-based method uses only ex ante holding information on portfolio forma-
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tion and therefore is not suered from the articial timing bias problem. In this
study, I re-examine whether managers have superior skills to time market illiquid-
ity/volatility than normal investors, through which we learn how important the
articial biases plays a role in timing literature. I contribute to the timing litera-
ture by providing new evidences that is not subject to false timing bias and thus
can show mutual fund's genuine timing performance.
Literature on return-based market timing, such as Treynor and Mazuy (1966),
Henriksson and Merton (1981), Becker et al. (1999), and Jiang (2003) , have doc-
ument insignicant or even negative market timing in mutual fund market. It is
hard to reconcile these results with the growing trading volume of mutual funds
in recent decades. To see if these evidences are biased by the non-information-
based strategy, Jiang et al. (2007) uses the holding-based method to reexplore
managers' ability to time market returns and conrm positive timing evidence on
actively managed U.S. equity funds. Motivated by their research, in this study,
I re-examine liquidity/volatility- timing evidences in previous literature through
holding-based model. I am interested in answering whether managers utilize liq-
uidity/volatility information to adjust their portfolio, and whether the articial
timing problem biases our knowledge of liquidity/volatility timing.
I focus on the liquidity and volatility timing for several reasons. First of all, unlike
market returns, market liquidity and market volatility are both persistent, which
makes it more predictable. It is easier for managers to utilize these information to
adjust their portfolio exposure. Secondly, liquidity and volatility are all important
factors when discussing to market risk premiums. For example, during the 2008
market crash, market liquidity dried up immediately and triggered more serious
depreciation of stock prices, while market volatility also surges during this period.
Literature have also documented signicant results between market volatility, liq-
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uidity, and returns. French et al. (1987) reports a negative relationship between
volatility shock and excess holding period returns. Acharya and Pedersen (2005)
shows that the covariance between liquidity and market returns accounts for most
part of liquidity risk and strongly aects expected returns. Positive liquidity shock
brings low expected returns and thus contemporaneous price appreciation. Given
these evidences, I put my emphasis on managers' ability to time market liquidity
and market volatility.
I propose to use bootstrapped statistics to account for the multiple comparison
problem to rule out the case that managers show timing skills by pure luck. I
start our analysis from conrming the positive liquidity timing evidence on return-
based method in the literature. Then I re-examine the timing abilities using the
holding-based approach. The comparison between the two approaches shed lights
on how strong the articial biases are and provides us new knowledge about fund
managers' skills.
2.2 Measuring Market Timing
In this section, I show the traditional return-based timing measure could be con-
taminated by the articial timing bias. I start with introducing the return based
timing measure proposed by the leasing research Treynor and Mazuy (1966).
2.2.1 Return-based measures
The return-based timing approach are initiated by the leading research Treynor and
Mazuy (1966). This approach is built on the traditional capital asset pricing model.
The intuition is to to approximate managers' portfolio exposure to market risk as
a linear function of his information about future market condition. Specically, the
return process follows the equation:
rpt+1 = ap + bp;trmt+1 + vpt+1 (2.1)
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bp;t = bp + t  E(zt+1jIt) (2.2)
, where rpt+1 denotes the excess portfolio return on time t+1, rmt+1 is the market
excess return on time t + 1, and bp;t is the market beta of the portfolio. Market
beta bp;t can be expressed as two parts: the average portfolio exposure bp and the
exposure based on the current information It about future market condition zt+1.
The coecient t captures how the portfolio exposure changes with the forecasted
condition, i.e. a manager's timing ability. When market condition zt+1 captures the
market return, these equations represent the timing model proposed in Treynor
and Mazuy (1966). When zt+1 captures market liquidity, the coecient represents
managers' liquidity-timing skills.
2.2.2 Articial timing bias
Plugging equation (2.2) into equation (2.1), it is clear that the return-based timing
measure capture managers' timing ability through the interaction term between
market return rmt+1 and the market condition zt+1. Such an approach has a prob-
lem: any non-information-based strategy that can induce the interaction relation-
ship would also be identied as managers' timing ability. This problem is known as
\articial timing" or \false timing". One example that has been widely addressed
in the literature is the interim trading bias, which occurs when fund performance
is evaluated at a lower frequency than that a manager can trade. This bias is very
similar to the issue occurred when using unconditional asset pricing model to eval-
uate managers' performance while he actually trades conditionally. Specically,
assume a fund manager, who have no timing ability, changes his portfolio expo-
sure daily based on the public information zt he observed. His conditional portfolio
exposure could be expressed as:
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bp;t = bp + t  zt + t  E(zt+1jIt) (2.3)
, where zt is the public observable information at day t, t captures managers
reaction to observable public information, and the conditional timing coecient ct
is equal to 0 since I assume the manager has no timing ability. Therefore, the true
return regenerating process of the managed fund follows:
rpt+1 = ap + bprmt+1 + t  zt  rmt+1 + ct  E(zt+1jIt)  rmt+1 + vpt+1 (2.4)
, with the conditional timing coecient ct = 0. Now assume that I can only
evaluate portfolio performance at a lower weekly level  . Withing this week, I can
observe nothing but the return and the market condition at the end of the week,
which means we do not have any information about the simultaneous change of
market condition and the reaction of manager every day in this week  . In other
words, I can only use unconditional model to evaluate the manager's timing ability
at this lower frequency:
rp+1 = ap + bprm+1 + 
u
  E(z+1jI )  rm+1 + vp+1 (2.5)
Comparing equation (2.4) and equation (2.5), it is clear that the unconditional
timing measure u absorbs the eect of manager's reaction to public information t
and probably would result in a signicant timing coecient at the lower frequency
even if there is no timing ability. A simple example in the review paper Aragon
and Ferson (2006) clearly illustrates this interim bias problem. Suppose a terrorist
event occurs in the middle of the day, which increase market volatility a lot in
the second-half of the day. A manager observe this event and immediately reduce
his portfolio exposure to reduce his volatility risk. If I can only observe daily but
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not intraday data in this case, this manager's portfolio performance would be
looked like the manager have foreseen the high volatility and adjusted his portfolio
beforehand in a way that it is exposed less on volatility risk. The timing model at
a lower frequency misidentify the higher-frequency reaction as the timing ability.
This articial timing bias the results not only in return timing, but also in liquidity
and volatility timing.
Other than dynamic trading, holding options is also one means that could gener-
ate such an interaction eect in a return regression and come up with false timing.
For example, Vega, which is dened as @Pricepotion=@volatilityunderlying ,measures
the sensitivity between market return and underlying volatility, reaches its max-
imum when a standard option is at the money. When market goes up and a out
of money call becomes at the money call due to underlying positive return, Vega
rises accordingly. i.e.:
@V egat
@rmt
=
@Pricepotion=@volatilityunderlying
@rmt
 @Pricepotion
@volatilityunderlying@rmt
> 0 (2.6)
Assuming that a manager hold a portfolio that contains this option on market
index, the last tern in equation (2.6) exactly shows an interaction relationship
between market return and market volatility in a return regression. The return-
based timing method therefore identify false volatility timing when a fund manager
simply holds an option.
Such an interaction eect of holding an option could also occurs through a
demand channel when the option market and the underlying market are not perfect
substitute for each other. For instance, the price of an index option increase when
the underlying market experience signicant appreciation. The prosperity of the
underlying market results in more liquid underlying assets and therefore attracts
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more investor to join the option market. The demand of the option market further
pushes the option price up. In this case, option returns increases more when the
underlying market is more liquid due to the increase of demand. This demand
channel exactly replicate a interaction eect between market return and market
liquidity and thus would results in a positive liquidity timing evidence in a return-
based timing model.
2.2.3 The Holding-based Measure
The return based measure use the non-linearity of portfolio returns with regard to
market condition as the evidence of timing ability. The advantage of this methodol-
ogy is its minimal information requirement, which needs only fund returns, market
returns, and the proxy for market conditions. However, when the portfolio hold-
ing of each fund is observable, I can directly compute fund exposure, i.e. beta,
through weight-averaging individual stock betas held by the portfolio. Due to the
increase of data availability, this holding-based measure has become an applicable
alternative for the return-based method.
With manager's holding data, I am able to compute fund beta as:
^p;t =
NX
i=1
wp;itb^it (2.7)
, where ^p;t is the estimated beta of portfolio p, wp;it is the portion of asset i hold
in portfolio p at the end of time t, and b^it is the estimated beta of asset i. The
holding-based timing measure examines the correlation between portfolio exposure
and the proxy for future market conditions. In other words, I examine manager's
timing ability through estimating the following regression:
zt+1 = ap + p  ^p;t + "p;t+1 (2.8)
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, where zt+1 is the proxy for market condition, say liquidity or volatility, at time
t+1, and p denotes the holding-based timing measure of portfolio p. A signicant
coecient p implies that a manager forecast future market condition at time
t+ 1and adjust his exposure at the end of time t.
There are at least two strength of holding-based measure. First, holding-based
method computes portfolio exposure from the estimated beta of individual stocks,
which utilize the information at a higher frequency (daily return data of individual
stocks are easily available). Including the information of manager's holding and the
individual beta brings holding-based measure information advantage. For example,
Jiang et al. (2007) use a simulation to show that the standard errors of the holding-
based measure is much smaller than those of return-based measure and conrms
that the holding-based measure have superior statistical power.
Secondly and most importantly, the holding-based measure looks for manager's
ability to take action before any changes in value of the portfolio. It does not
rely on subsequent portfolio returns that could subject to non-information-based
strategies. Therefore, the holding-based measure is not subject to the articial
timing biaseswhich provides us a nice basis to reexamine managers' timing ability.
This research not only allows to know more about the timing ability, it also features
the importance of articial biases in the past return-based studies.
2.2.4 Estimation of Holdings Beta
The portfolio exposure for each mutual fund can be calculated as the weighted
average beta of individual stocks held by the fund. I use 1-year historical daily
stock return from CRSP data set to estimate individual stock beta following Jiang
et al. (2014). Specically, beta for each stock (b^i) is estimate as the following
equations:
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ri;t = ai +
5X
q= 5
bi;qrm;t q + ei;t (2.9)
b^i =
5X
q= 5
b^i;q (2.10)
, where ri;t is the return of stock i at day t, rm;t q denotes the market return at
day t   q, and b^i is the estimated beta of stock i. I include market returns up
to ve days leads and lags to account for the eect of nonsynchronous trading.
I require stocks to have at least 60 observations during our estimation period. I
assume  = 1 for these stocks that do not satisfy our requirement.
I am interested in how managers take position based on their forecast. Therefore,
I control for the dierences of portfolio exposures that is resulted from passive
strategy. Following Daniel et al. (1997), I form the passive characteristics portfolios
by sorting stocks into 5 groups according to its size based on the NYSE breakpoints.
Then I sort stocks into 5 groups according to its book-to-market ratio within each
size-group and then 5 momentum groups within each size-BM groups. I use market
capitalization as the proxy for rm size at the end of each month. Book value of
each stock is based on the most recently reported scal year, with at least 3-
months gap to make sure the data is observable. The momentum is measured
as the total stock returns during the previous six months. I rebalance our 125
passive characteristics portfolios each month and compute the average beta of
each characteristics portfolio as the passive betas. Finally, I subtract the passive
betas from original betas of each stocks that is in the same characteristics-matched
portfolio as our characteristics-adjusted stock beta. With the adjusted-beta and
managers' holding for each stock, I am able to compute weighted-averaged fund
beta for each mutual fund.
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2.2.5 Liquidity and Volatility Measures
Market liquidity cannot be observed directly. Past researchers have proposed prox-
ies for dierent dimensions of liquidity, such as trading cost (Amihud and Mendel-
son (1986), turnover (Datar et al. (1998), price impact (Amihud (2002) and Pastor
and Stambaugh (2003)), and trading speed (Liu (2006)). In this timing study, it is
especially important to know the interaction between liquidity and stock returns.
Therefore, I use Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Amihud (2002) measure to
capture the price impact of whole market as our liquidity measure.
The monthly data for Pastor and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) constructed as
the following regression:
rei;d+1;t = i;t + 'i;tri;d;t + i;tsign(r
e
i;d;t)  vi;d;t + i;d+1;t (2.11)
, where ri;d;t is the return on stock i on day d in month t. r
e
i;d;t is the excess stock
return stock i on day d in month t, computed as ri;d;t   rm;d;t, where rm;d;t is the
CRSP value-weighted market portfolio return. vi;d;t is the dollar volume for stock
i on day d in month t. The intuition of Pastor and Stampburg liquidity measure
is that the price reverse would be larger if a stock is more illiquid. As a result,
the coecient i;t captures such an eect as the liquidity measure. I compute the
market liquidity as scaled equal-weighted average liquidity measures of individual
stocks in our sample. The scaling factor mt=m1is the total market value at the end
of month of t   1 divided by the total market value at the end of July 1980, and
Nt is the number of stocks in month t.
t =
mt 1
m1
 1
Nt
NtX
i=1
i;t (2.12)
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To ensure our analysis is not sensitive to the liquidity measure I choose, I also
compute the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure as an alternative measure for price
impact. The Amihud illiquidity measure for stock i is computed as follows:
ILLIQit =
1
Di;t
Di;tX
d=1
jRitdj
V itd
(2.13)
, where Di;t denotes the trading days in month t for stock i, R
i
td is the return
on day d in month t for stock i, and V itd is the dollar volume in millions on day
d in month t. Then I construct a normalized Amihud market illiquidy measure
following Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Cao et al. (2013b) as:
cit = min(0:25 + 0:3ILLIQ
i
t 
mt 1
m1
; 30) (2.14)
, where mt=m1 is the same scaling factor I used in the Pastor and Stambaugh mea-
sure with the base period of 1980. I choose the parameters 0.25 and 30 following
Cao, Simin, and Wang (2013) to normalize illiquidity measure and eliminate out-
liers. Based on this normalized illquidity measure, I compute the market illiquidity
measure ct as:
ct =
1
Nt
NtX
i=1
cit (2.15)
where Nt is the number of stocks in month t. To match the data frequency of
mutual holding, I average both Pastor and Stambaugh and Armihud monthly
liquidity data into 1, 2, 3, and 4 quarterly data in the latter analysis.
2.2.6 Bootstrapping Approach
When the statistical inference is based on a large number of funds, some managers
must create extreme returns by chance. They change their portfolio exposure by
pure luck in a way that they seemingly to have anticipated market liquidity. This
15
is addressed as the multiple comparison problem in the literature. To distinguish
manager's skill form luck, I randomly bootstrap our data under the null of no
timing-ability while keep the cross-sectional holding of mutual funds xed to gen-
erate psudo-distributions of our statistics as the benchmark for comparison.
The bootstrap procedure conducted in this study follows Jiang, Yao, and Yu
(2007). Let  (:) be the cross-sectional statistic I am interested in, which is related
to the holding-based beta, the market liquidity/volatility at a specic quantile. For
example, I can express  (:) as  (bt; liqt+1; q), which denotes the liquidity timing
measure ^i or its t-statistic at the cross-sectional quantile q. I simulate the distribu-
tion of  (:) under the null of no timing ability with 2000 bootstrapped replication.
To ensure the bootstrapped results is under the null of no timing-ability while
maintaining the cross-sectional covariance structure of mutual fund betas, I keep
the holding-beta for each fund unchanged in each simulation. I randomly draw
market liquidity/volatility from our sample period to form a bootstrapped liquid-
ity data in each simulation and match the bootstrapped data with holding-betas.
In other words, I disconnect the relationship between managers' fund holding with
market condition and create a distribution of  (:) under no timing ability.
Through comparing the empirical t-statistics and the bootstrapped t statistics,
I am able to compute the bootstrapped p-values for each quantile. I compute the
bootstrapped p-value as the ratio of positive-timing to the number of bootstrapping
simulation, i.e. 2000 times. For example, out of 2000 times of simulation, if only
5% of the bootstrapped  b(:) shows a superior timing ability than the real  (:)
I observe in the real data, the p-value is 0.05. The bootstrapped p-value use the
psudo-distribution of estimated statistics in a world without timing ability as the
benchmark. Therefore, through it I am able to evaluate the managers' timing
ability that is more than by luck.
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2.3 Summary
In this section, I propose to use a holdings-based approach to re-examine managers'
illiquidity and volatility timing abilities. Traditional timing studies use a return-
based method to estimate the non-linearity of portfolio returns as the measure of
fund managers' timing abilities. However, such a measure suers from the articial
timing bias. The holdings approach is free from such a bias and could provide as
more accurate evidence about managers' skills.
Moreover, I account for the multiple comparison problem by using bootstrapping
approaches, which allows us to exclude those managers who seems to be able
to time market volatility and illiquidity but actually is due to luck. This study
contributes to the literature by correcting the articial bias in evaluating managers'
illiquidity and volatility timing abilities and help us better understand their skills.
17
Chapter 3
Illiquidity and Volatility Reactions of
Mutual Fund Managers
3.1 Introduction
In 2014, 15.9 trillion of assets are under active management by mutual fund man-
agers who, on behalf of their clients, charge expense for their service. Given an
average 0.70% expense fee (Investment Company Fact Book 2015), mutual fund
managers extract a remarkable rent from clients. Naturally, two questions, under-
standing whether mutual fund managers add value to their clients to justify their
fees and how to identify skilled outperforming fund managers, have long been in-
triguing to both academics and practitioners. This paper focuses on these two
questions and shows that mutual fund managers' reaction to market-wide volatil-
ity and illiquidity can strongly predict future fund performance that no previous
papers have uncovered.
It is worth discussing upfront why reaction can be related to future fund perfor-
mance. At rst thought, no relation should be expected since public information
to which fund managers react cannot generate any rent to funds. However, man-
agers could react very dierently to the market condition based on their private
information or motivation. A fund manager could take actions that are consistent
with a rational risk-averse investor because of his rigorous training. However, he
could also do so for the lack of skills. Similarly, a manager could increase risk expo-
sure during market turmoil to explore his private information, or to gamble with
client's money to maximize his personal benet. It is not clear beforehand whether
the cautious or aggressive reactions reect managers' skills and can be used to
predict future fund performance. If they do, what are the economic motives and
the performance consequence of these reactions are still unanswered.
18
Although we are not the rst one to consider the mutual funds' reaction to
market volatility and liquidity (see Cao et al. (2013a) and Busse (1999)), none of
the previous studies has found a signicant relation between reaction and portfo-
lio future performance. We dier from the previous studies by designing two new
measures to better capture fund managers' reaction and dierentiate two stories
behind cautious and aggressive reactions. We answer the question of whether fund
managers take more risk because of superior skills or ill-incentives. Specically, we
test two alternative hypotheses: (1) Cautious (aggressive) reaction to market illiq-
uidity/volatility signies the skill (ill-incentive) of a manager and predicts good
(bad) future performance, and (2) Aggressive (cautious) reaction to market illiq-
uidity/volatility is driven by superior skill (the lack of skills) and predicts good
(bad) future performance.
When fund managers react to market conditions, their portfolio exposure would
be a function of the observable market condition. Therefore, we estimate our rst
reaction measure using a conditional Carhart model with an interaction term be-
tween market excess return and market illiquidity/volatility following Treynor and
Mazuy (1966), Ferson and Schadt (1996), and Carhart (1997). Instead of using
actual fund returns, we compute the hypothetical fund returns based on mutual
fund holdings data and past individual stock returns as our dependent variable.
The idea is to assume that managers use past individual stock information as the
expectation to the future performance of these stocks, based on which he form the
optimal holdings for his fund. Therefore, the hypothetical fund return contains the
forward-looking information of managers' investment decision. The coecient of
the interaction term shows the sensitivity of market beta to market condition, and
captures managers' reactions. We label this coecient of the interaction term as
the 'intended reaction' measure.
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There are two concerns about measure managers' reaction using the intended
reaction measure. When the underlying asset react to market condition due to me-
chanical reasons, we might detect fake reactions even though managers actually did
nothing. Moreover, the intended reaction level reect managers' aggregate portfolio
adjustment. If the adjusting cost is high, especially during volatile market, most of
the information in the intended reaction measure might come form the historical
adjustments. In this case, it would not be appropriate to use the intended reaction
to study managers' reactions to the contemporaneous market condition.
To better understand managers' reaction to contemporaneous market informa-
tion, we construct our second measure, the 'reaction shift' measure, as the dier-
ence between our intended reaction measure and funds' realized reaction measure
that estimated by using actual fund returns. The reaction shift captures managers'
change of reaction at each period and can provide us more clear information of
managers' response to the contemporaneous market condition. Since our reaction
shift is the dierence between two the reaction measures during identical period,
it naturally controls the exogenous changes in market conditions in dierent time
periods. Such exogenous changes could be especially severe in episodes of market
turmoil when managers react to the market condition the most. Better than the
simple time dierence of reaction level, our reaction shift is free of the bias resulting
from exogenous market changes.
The closest related research to our study is Huang et al. (2011), which studies
the motivation and the performance consequences behind managers' risk shift be-
havior. They construct their risk-shifting measure as the dierence between funds'
hypothetical holding volatility and funds' realized volatility. They nd a bad per-
formance of volatility shifters, in both positive and negative direction, and conclude
that risk shifting is motivated by agency issues. Our study is dierent from theirs
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in that I focus on managers' reactions in response to observable market illiquid-
ity/volatility condition rather than on the change of total portfolio volatility.
3.2 The Model
Our measures of managers' illiquidity/volatility reaction are built on the pioneer
timing research Treynor and Mazuy (1966). Before introducing our model, it is
important to point out the main dierence that distinguish our study on reaction
from the past timing literature.
Past literature that study managers skills mainly focuses on their timing abil-
ity. In other words, they study whether managers can predict the future market
condition and adjustment the portfolio exposure prior to the change. A rational
risk-averse manager who predict good future market performance would increase
his portfolio exposure before the market boom, and vise versa. Researchers identify
skilled managers based on whether the portfolio beta is a function of future market
condition.
Rather than focusing on managers' ability to predict the future market condi-
tion, this study looks into managers' reactions to the observable market condition.
Perhaps it is not surprising that the literature did not put much emphasis on man-
agers reactions to the market condition, since the market condition is observable to
every investor and the collection of which does not require special skills. However,
the heterogeneity of managers reactions could reects their diverse perspectives
and motivations. A manager who increase portfolio exposure when market is bad
does not have to be a nave investor. He might be a rational skilled investor driven
by private information. Similarly, a manager who behave as a rational risk-averse
investor could so so because of his rigorous training. It is also possible that such
an manager is simply lack of skills. Studying managers reactions allows us to ex-
plore a new dimension of managers ability, from which we can distinguish dierent
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stories behind managers' reactions. To my knowledge, very few studies looked into
managers' reactions. Even though some eort has been made, there is no conclu-
sive result that managers' reaction can be a signal for their quality. For example,
Busse (1999) study managers reaction to market volatility, and Cao et al. (2003)
focus on the managers' liquidity. However, both studies did not nd evidence that
managers' reaction are associate with their future performance.
In this study, we use managers' holdings data, which allows us to direct observe
managers' asset allocation, to construct two new reaction measures to capture
managers' reactions to the observable market volatility/illiquidity condition. The
holding-based measure contains forward-looking information and can better cap-
tures managers' reaction behavior. In this section, I demonstrate how we estimate
our illiquidity/volatility reaction measure.
3.2.1 The Reaction Measures
We start with measuring fund managers' reaction to market liquidity. Following
the widely used Carhart (1997) model in the asset pricing literature, fund return
can be written as the following four-factor regression:
Rpt = p + mktRMkt;t + smbRSMB;t + hmlRHML;t + umdRUMD;t + t (3.1)
, where Rpt is the portfolio(fund) return at time t, and RMkt;t, RSMB;t, RHML;t,
RUMD;t stand for the mimicking portfolio returns of the market, size, book-to-
market, and momentum factor. We can easily re-write equation 3.1 in a more
compact form as equation 3.2:
Rpt = p +
4X
j=1
[jRjt] + t (3.2)
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When a manager changes his portfolio market exposure in response to the ob-
servable market illiquidity condition, his portfolio beta would be a function of the
market condition. If we assume the function is in a simple linear form, the function
could be written as equation 3.3:
mkt = 0;mkt + Illiq(IlliqMkt;observable) (3.3)
, where mkt is the market exposure of the portfolio, which can be separated into
two parts: the constant part 0;mkt, and the part that depends on the observ-
able market illiquidity: Illiq(IlliqMkt;observable). The Illiq captures the sensitivity
of market exposure to the market illiquidity. Plug equation 3.3 into equation 3.2,
we have the following relationship:
Rpt = p +
4X
j=1
[jRjt + Illiq(IlliqMkt;t 1 RMkt;t) + t (3.4)
, which is a Carhart (1997) model with an interaction term between the market
excess return at time RMkt;t and the observable market illiquidity IlliqMkt;t 1 at
time t  1.
Empirically, I estimate the Illiq coecient in equation 3.4 with slightly modi-
cation as our illiquidity reaction measure. First of all, to account for the the eects
of nonsynchronous trading that occurs in the high-frequency daily data estima-
tion, I put the lag terms of the four factors into equation 3.4. Then I estimate
^IlliqHold in equation 3.4 as our rst measure of managers' illiquidity reaction. Sec-
ondly, instead of using actual fund returns as the dependent variable, I compute
hypothetical fund returns for the past 1-year at every quarter end q using fund
holdings and individual stock returns as the LHS variable. The equation 3.4 can
be re-written as:
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RHold;t = p +
4X
j=1
[jRjt + ljRj;t 1] + ^IlliqHold(IlliqMkt;t 1 RMkt;t) + t (3.5)
, where RHold;t are the hypothetical fund returns. Specically, at every quarter
end q, I compute the hypothetical fund return RHold;t for quarter [q-3 to q] by
using the holdings that reported in quarter q and the individual stock returns for
[q-3 to q]. Then I run a regression as equation 3.5 using daily data to estimate
the coecient ^IlliqHold;q as our measure of illiquidity reaction at quarter q. Here
I assume that managers use the past-1-year stock returns as his expectation of
the stock performance for the next holding period, based on which he adjust his
portfolio to match his intended asset allocation. Therefore, the reaction measure
^IlliqHold;q contains the forward-looking information (since the holdings at quarter
end q reect his allocation for quarter q+1). Therefore, we label the illiquidity
reaction measure ^IlliqHold;q as managers' \intended" illiquidity reaction.
However, there are some potential issues that could weaken the validity of mea-
suring managers' reactions using the intended reaction measure. First of all, the
reaction level of a fund reect the aggregate of a manager's historical adjustment
based on his information from period to period. If the adjustment cost is too high
to stop a manager from making a full adjustment in a short term, the current
reaction level will not be able to reect the manager's optimal reaction to the con-
temporaneous information. Instead, it would mostly reect the past portfolio ad-
justments. Secondly, a portfolio's reaction to market illiquidity might not be driven
by information-based motivation. For example, the underlying asset returns could
have a mechanical response to market illiquidity. In this case, the time-varying mar-
ket exposure does not reect any skill since the manager did nothing in response
to market illiquidity condition. Hence, I compute our second measure, the shift
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of illiquidity reaction, as a more informative way to capture managers' intention-
driven reaction to market illiquidity. Specically, I rst run the same multi-factor
regression as equation 3.4, except that we use funds' realized daily returns for [q-3
to q] as the dependent variable:
RReport;t = p +
3X
j=1
[jRjt + ljRj;t 1] + ^IlliqReport(IlliqMkt;t 1 RMkt;t) + t (3.6)
to estimate the actual illiquidity reaction IlliqReport for [q-3 to q]. Then as a way
to control for mechanical reasons of illiquidity reaction in ^IlliqHold, our second
measure of illiquidity reaction is the dierence between the intended reaction and
the actual reaction level:
^IlliqShift = ^IlliqHold   ^IlliqReport (3.7)
The measure ^IlliqShift captures manager's change of illiquidity reaction at every
quarter end q relative to funds' realized reaction level, and, therefore, more clearly
reect managers' response to the contemporaneous market illiquidity. Following
the same procedure, I can also compute mutual fund managers' intended volatility
reaction level as well as volatility reaction shift measure:
RHold;t = p +
3X
j=1
[jRjt + ljRj;t 1] + V olHold(V olm;t 1 RMkt;t) + t
^V olShift = ^V olHold;t   ^V olReport
(3.8)
With managers' holding data, our reaction measures utilize the daily data of
individual stocks held by a fund, which brings us superior information advantage
over the past return-based measures that use only a lower monthly frequency fund
return data, such as in Cao et al. (2013a). Daily data also allows us to have more
precise estimators and higher statistic powers.
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Instead of the dierences between two sequential actual reaction level, our reac-
tion shift measure is the dierence between the intended reaction and the actual
reaction measured in the identical period. Therefore, our reaction shift measure is
not aected by exogenous changes in market conditions across time periods. Such
changes are especially signicant during market turmoil when managers' portfolio
adjustment shows their skills the most and, therefore, bias the results the most. The
nice property of our reaction-shift measure allows us to better explore managers'
reaction and the corresponding return performances.
3.2.2 Market Illiquidity Measure
To take the information advantage of daily data to explore managers' illiquidity
reaction, I slightly modify the Amihud(2002) illiquidity measure as our daily mar-
ket illiquidity measure. For each trading day d, I rst calculate the absolute stock
return divided by dollar volume (in millions) for each stock. Then I make the
Acharya-Pedersen adjustment following Achaya and Pedersen (2005). Specically,
I compute:
Illiqi;t = minf[0:25 + 0:3  jRi;tj
Vi;t
 mm 1
m1
]; 30g (3.9)
, where Illiqid denotes the illiquidity measure of stock i on day d, the scaling factor
mm 1=m1 is the total market value at the end of last month divided by the total
market value at the end of July 1980. Acharya and Pedersen put an upper bound
of 30 to the illiquid measure for a better property. In our measure, if a stock has
0 trading volume on day t, which could be considered extremely illiquid, I set the
Illiqi;t to 30 for the stock i on that trading day t. Finally, we calculate our daily
market illiquidity measure as the cross-section average of Illiqi;t:
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Illiqmkt;t =
1
Nt
NtX
i=1
Illiqi;t (3.10)
, where Nt is the number of stocks on day t.
3.2.3 Market Volatility Measures
I choose EGARCH(1,1) model with a leverage term and t-distribution errors to
capture the daily conditional market volatility following Busse (1999). The condi-
tional variance 2mt is specied as follows:
ln2mt = a+ a1 
jm;t 1j+ 1m;t 1
m;t 1
+ b1ln
2
m;t 1 (3.11)
, where mtjm;t 1; m;t 2:::  t(0; 2mt).
The time-series plot of the liquidity and volatility measure are presented in
gure 3.1. To make the two series comparable, I scale the market volatility up
for 5000 times. The Gray line is the time series of the market illiquidity, and the
black line is the market volatility. Both volatility and illiquidity capture important
dimension of market states. I see that the two series show similar patterns. The
surge of illiquidity around the year 2001 is due to the burst of dot-com bubble.
The market volatility is also high during that period. The other peak happens
in the 2008 nancial crisis, during when the market lost a lot of liquidity and,
investors are experiencing a very high level of uncertainty. These ups and downs of
market condition aects fund returns through not only the returns returns of the
underlying assets, but also the funding of these funds. For instance, the redemption
of investors when facing high uncertainty and the re sale of assets both hurt
fund performance. Therefore, managers' reactions to the market condition is very
important, and the study of which helps us better understand managers' skills.
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FIGURE 3.1. Time-series Pattern of Volatility and Illiquidity Measures
In this gure, I show the time-series patterns of S&P 500 volatility and our daily version of Amihud Illiquidity
measure. The S&P 500 volatility is estimated using EGARCH(1.1) model following Busse (1999) and the Illiq-
uidtity measure is computed following Amihud (2002) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005). I use stock data from
the CRSP database. To make the two series comparable, I scale the S&P 500 volatility up for 5000 times. The
Gray line in the gure is the time series of the market illiquidity, and the black line is time series of the market
volatility.
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3.3 Motivation of Managers' Reaction and Reaction Shift
With managers' Illiquidity and volatility reactions, I could further investigate man-
agers' portfolio performance, based on which I can distinguish the motives behind
these reaction behaviors.
To further investigate the motivation behind managers' reaction behaviors, I
incorporate several fund characteristics that are relates to the agency problem
in the literature to see how these characteristics interact with fund managers'
reactions. Specically, I rst sort our mutual fund sample into quintile portfolios
by our reaction measures at the end every quarter. Then I further sort funds into
5 subgroups under each reaction quintile by the proxy for the agency problem,
including fund expense ratio, fund age, and past performance. Finally, I compute
the Carhart alphas for the 25 reaction-characteristic portfolios.
Mutual funds managers charge fees to cover their nancial service, operation
cost, and advertising costs. However, literature did not nd a positive relationship
between the fee and the fund performance. For example, Gil-bazo and Ruiz-Verdu
(2009) nd that even before expense, high-expense funds do not show superior
skills. Their explanation of this result is an agency problem. High-expense funds
attract non-experienced investors and put their investments in risky assets. In
this case, the abnormal returns of positive illiquidity/volatility reactors could be
especially lower for funds with higher agency problem.
The asymmetry relationship between fund performance and fund ows addressed
in Chevalier and Ellison (1997) gives managers an incentive to take risks. Chevalier
and Ellison nd that investors tends to move into a fund quickly when it performs
well, but they are less sensitive when moving out of a low performance fund.
Chevalier and Ellison also nd that this asymmetry is stronger for younger rms.
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Therefore, using fund age as a proxy for agency problems, I expect that younger
rms could perform worse when their reactions are not driven by information.
Through comparing the performance of funds with the same reaction but dier-
ent level of agency problem proxied by expense ratio and fund age, I can further
understand whether managers' reactions are associate with the agency problem,
through which I can further understand what kind of reactions reect skilled man-
agers' discipline and superior risk management ability.
3.4 Trading Costs and Liquidity Concerns
In this section, I further look into how fund managers' trading costs and liquidity
concerns interact with with managers' illiquidity/volatility reaction and, therefore,
provide us a complete picture of managers' behavior.
Turnover rate measures how actively a portfolio is managed. To see if the port-
folio dierence between dierent reactors are driven by the cost generate by the
strategy, I double sort funds based on the turnover and the reactions. If the return
dierence between dierent reactions are not signicant dierent, then I am more
condent to say that the performance dierence reect the incentives behind man-
agers' reactions. I further check manager' cash holdings. Funds with higher cash
position suer less from outows because they have more cushion for investors'
redemptions. I expected those with low cash holdings suer the most when their
behavior is driven by ill incentives.
3.5 Conclusion
Mutual fund managers, probably the most sophisticated investors in the market,
adjust their portfolio in response to the conditional market information. The cross-
sectional heterogeneity of managers' reactions reects fund managers' skills and
private motivations. However, literature concerning fund managers' skills mainly
put emphasis on how managers predict future information while overlook how they
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react to the observable information. Even for the very few studies that looked into
managers' reactions, there is no evidence that mutual fund managers' reactions
are related to their future performance.
This study contribute to the literature by constructing two new reaction mea-
sures by using the mutual holdings data. Using managers' holdings data has several
advantages. First of all, it allows us to directly observe mutual fund managers' as-
set allocation and provide us more information about fund managers' decisions.
Secondly, using holdings data allows as to utilize individual stocks information in a
daily frequency, which brings in the information advantage relative to studies that
use only fund returns data. This study evaluates managers' skills from a relatively
overlooked angle form the literature and distinguish the economic motives between
dierent reaction behaviors.
31
Chapter 4
Equity Duration and Stock Market
Volatility
4.1 Introduction
Campbell et al. (2001) documented a signicant positive slope idiosyncratic volatil-
ity trend from 1962 to 1997, whereas the aggregate market volatility seems to be
constant during this period. This puzzling result initiates a stream of active asset
pricing studies trying to explain the upward trend. Some of the studies explore
the phenomena from the perspective of investor composition. For example, Ben-
nett et al. (2003) proposes that institutional investors have change their preference
toward smaller and riskier securities and therefore increase the rm-specic risks.
Morck et al. (2000a) states that a higher rm specic return variation could be
resulted from better shareholder protection. Brandt et al. (2009) argues that the
increase of idiosyncratic volatility are most signicant rms with low prices and
high retail ownership. Other studies put their emphasis on the angle of fundamen-
tal changes. For instance, Wei and Zhang (2006) states that rm fundamentals
have become more volatile. Irvine and Ponti (2009) propose that product market
have become more competitive. Cao et al. (2008) argues that managers choose
more risky project to increase growth option values. While these studies provide
dierent angles to explore the dynamic of market idiosyncratic volatility, most of
them fail to explain the downward idiosyncratic volatility trend after year 2000.
In this study, I propose a new explanation based on the cash ow horizon of
stocks for to the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. I show that stock duration plays
a role as a multiple, whose change amplies the shock of discount rate. I propose
the dynamic of stock duration as an alternative explanation for the upward trend
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through late 1990s. Moreover, I show that the market equity duration explains the
ups and downs of market idiosyncratic volatility after year 2000.
Given the positive relationship between equity duration and market volatility,
I investigate whether market equity duration is associated with positive market
returns. Literature focused on the cross-sectional relationship between the cash ow
horizon and risk premium have documented a negative relationship. For example,
studies about value premium argues that the premium is associate with the shorter
implied stock duration. (see Lettau and Wachter (2007) and Croce et al. (2014).
In our study, I complement the literature by showing a time-series relationship
between the aggregate market duration and the market risk premium.
4.2 Methodology
In this section, I exhibit the duration model from the xed income literature. I show
how the model is applied to the equity market. Finally, I derive the relationship
between the implied equity duration and the expected returns.
4.2.1 Equity Duration and Idiosyncratic Volatility
Following the traditional xed income literature, the duration of a bond can be
expressed as:
D =
PT
1 t CFt(1+r)t
P
(4.1)
, where CFt is the cash ow of period t (generally expressed as bond dividend D),
P is the current price of the bond, and r denotes the discount rate. The idea of
duration is basically the weighted average time of receiving the future cash ow,
weighted by the proportion of the present value of the cash ow to the present
value of the bond. Similarly , the same idea could be applied to stock market as
the following equation:
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Dt =   @lnPt
@ln(1 + qt)
=
1
Pt
[
TX
k=1
k
CFt+k
(1 + qt)k
+
1X
k=T+1
k
CFt+T+1
(1 + qt)k
]
=
1
Pt
[
TX
k=1
k
CFt+k
(1 + qt)k
+ CFt+T+1
qt(T + 1) + 1
q2t (1 + qt)
t
]
(4.2)
, where Dt is the equity duration, Pt is the stock price at time t, and CFt denotes
the cash ow at time t. Here I assume the the future cash ow of an equity can be
separate into two parts, a nite growing period and an innite stable period. The
rst term of the third raw captures the cash ow of the nite growing period, and
the second term captures cash ows for the periods where the growth of the cash
ow has converged to a economic-wide growth rate.
Shifting the denominator to the right-hand side, the relationship between equity
returns and the discount rate shock can be expressed as d(lnPt) =  Dtd(ln(1+qt)).
From this equation, I can derive the relationship between the volatility of stock
returns and the volatility of the discount rate shock news as:
t(d(lnPt)) = Dtt(d(ln(1 + qt))) (4.3)
, which give us a prediction for the following regression:
t(d(lnPt)) = k0 + k1Dt + et (4.4)
, where k1 > 0.
Further, we see that d(lnPt) =  Dtd(ln(1 + qt)) =   Dt1+qtdqt, which means
t(d(lnPt)) =
Dt
1+qt
t(dqt). As discount rate qtis inversely related to duration Dt,
1
1+qt
should be positively related to Dt. Therefore, we may use a linear form to
approximate 1
1+qt
 a+ bDt, with a b > 0.
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Given the result, we can rewrite t(d(lnPt)) = Dt(a + bDt)t(dqt) = (aDt +
bD2t )t(dqt), which gives us the regression relationship as following:
t(d(lnPt)) = k0 + k1Dt + k2D
2
t + et (4.5)
, with k2 = b > 0.
4.2.2 Equity Duration and Systemic Risks
To show how duration is linked to systematic risk of market portfolio and hence
risk premium, I decompose the discount rate shock of rm i into diversiable and
undiversiable parts from d(lnPt) =  Dtd(ln(1 + qt)). i.e.
d(ln(1 + qit)) = bishock
undiversifiable
t+dt + shock
diversifiable
i;t+dt (4.6)
, where biisthe beta of rm i's discount rate sock with respected to undiverable
shock. Here the subscript t+dt denotes that the shock is from time t to time t+dt.
To justify this equation, examples of undiverable shock can be shock to volatility
of aggregate consumption growth (which can be justied in Bansal and Yaron
(2004)), shock to representative agents risk aversion due to shock to their habit
(which can be justied in Campbell and Cochrane (1999)), or shock to investors
aggregate sentiment (Lettau and Wachter (2007)). Examples of diversiable shock
can be shock to rms liquidity or shock to rms information environment due to,
e.g., change in rms accounting disclosure activity or publicity activity.
Then
d(lnP it ) =  Ditd(ln(1 + qit)) =  Dit(bishockundiversifiablet+dt + shockdiversifiablei;t+dt )
= Ditbi( shockundiversifiablet+dt ) +Dit( shockdiversifiablei;t+dt )
= D^it( shockundiversifiablet+dt ) +Dit( shockdiversifiablei;t+dt )
(4.7)
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, where D^it is the adjusted duration for rm i at time t.
We now can see that D^it captures the stock i's return sensitivity to the systematic
discount rate shock. If we label rm i as the market portfolio, we get the prediction
that lengthening market duration or positive duration shock is linked to higher
market risk premium, hence higher subsequent market ex post risk premium.
Regarding the total volatility, we can also see from the analysis above that
totalt (d(lnP
i
t )) = D
i
t
total
t (d(ln(1 + q
i
t)))
=D^it
total
t ( shockundiversifiablet+dt ) +Dittotalt ( shockdiversifiablei;t+dt )
(4.8)
Therefore, total volatility of market can be positively related to duration D^it and
Dit.
4.3 Empirical Evidences
In this section, I compute the implied market equity duration for the S&P 500
stocks to empirically test if it aects market volatility and market returns as the
model predicts.
4.3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The sample covers the period from January 1977 to December 2010. Monthly an-
alysts earning forecasts are from the I/B/E/S database. The sample rms for
idiosyncratic volatility are stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ.
The trading information and accounting data are from the CRSP and Compu-
stat database.
To test the informativeness of equity duration for future ex-post risk premiums,
I introduce returns predictors that have been proposed in the literature as our
control variables. Those variables are term spread (TS), default spread (DEF),
trailing dividend-to-price ratio of the S&P 500 (DP), trailing earning-to-price ratio
of the S&P 500 (EP), Book to market ratio(BM), long-term rate of bond return
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(LTR), and stock variance (SVAR). DP is the 12-month moving sum of dividends
paid on the S&P 500 index divided by the S&P 500 index. EP is the 12-month
moving sum of earnings on the S&P 500 index divided by the S&P 500 index.
Monthly data are available from Professor Robert Shillers website. The B/M ratio
is the ratio of book value to market value for the Dow Jones Industrial Average. I
leave a gap of at least 3 months before the accounting data could be used. LTR is
the return on long-term government bonds. SVAR is the sum of the squared daily
returns on the S&P 500 index with a month. BM, LTR, and SVAR data could be
nd form Professor Amit Goyals website.
First of all, I construct the rm-level duration based on monthly data. I use
analysts' forecast to estimate stock future cash ow and calculate the log version
of equity duration. Focusing on S&P 500 rms, I construct the value weighted
average duration log(Dursp500) as our proxy for market duration. Secondly, to work
with stationary time series as well as discuss the relationship between the change
of market duration and the change of realized market risk premium, I compute the
monthly log growth rate of market duration gdur;t as well as the monthly shock on
the growth rate Shockdur;t by following the procedure similar to Hsu (2009). The
two measures are constructed as follows:
gdur;t = log(Dursp500;t)  1
12
12X
i=1
log(Dursp500;t i) (4.9)
Shockdur;t = gdur;t   1
12
12X
i=1
gdur;t i (4.10)
, where the choose of moving average could potentially remove the noise and mea-
surement errors due to seasonality in the data. I choose a moving window of 12 for
our using monthly data. I plot the series of log(Dursp500) as well as the two mea-
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sures gdur;t and Shockdur;t in Figure 1 and Figure 2. We can nd a positive trend of
log(Dursp500) before year 2000. After peaking in 2000, the market duration starts
to decrease in the last decade. For the two measures gdur;t and Shockdur;t, the series
seems to be stationary with a mean of zero.
Table 4.1 provides the correlation coecient of our sample. From Table 4.1,
we see that the implied market equity duration is positively related to all the
three levels of market volatility. The correlation with the industry volatility is
the highest among all, with a value of 0.445. It might not be surprising since the
equity duration is computed based on analysts' forecasts, which might heavily rely
on industry-level information.
TABLE 4.1. Correlation Coecients
firm ind mkt V wDur
firm 1.000 0.934 0.762 0.325
ind 1.000 0.782 0.445
mkt 1.000 0.171
V wDur 1.000
This table provides the correlation coecients among the three-levels of market volatility and our value-weighted
implied market duration.
Table 4.2 shows the summary statistics of market excess return (MktRf), mar-
ket duration, its growth rate, and the shock on that growth rate. In addition, I
also report traditional predictors (DP, EP, bm, TS, DEF, ltr, svar) literature has
proposed to predict future market excess return. The (rst-order) autocorrelations
of two new predictors that I propose is much lower (around 0.8) than traditional
predictors proposed in the literature. It means that, dierent from traditional pre-
dictors, they vary in a much higher frequency and can predict future market return
at a shorter horizon, if predictability exists.
Figure 4.1 shows the time-series pattern of the implied market equity duration.
The shaded area denote the NBER identied economic recessions. Aggregate mar-
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TABLE 4.2. Summery Statistics
Mean Std Max Min AC(1) AC(12)
MktRf 0.0053 0.0459 0.1243 -0.2314 0.1109 0.0033
Dursp500;t 2.9989 0.2115 3.4064 2.4368 0.9861 0.8357
gdur;t 0.0065 0.0574 0.1689 -0.1476 0.8308 -0.1274
Shockdur;t -0.0012 0.0566 0.1788 -0.1664 0.8074 -0.4410
DP 0.0270 0.0118 0.0637 0.0108 0.9898 0.8393
EP 0.0571 0.0249 0.1326 0.0079 0.9846 0.6513
BM 0.3995 0.2380 1.2065 0.1205 0.9878 0.8050
TS 0.0303 0.0144 0.0593 -0.0221 0.9546 0.4089
DEF 0.0111 0.0050 0.0338 0.0055 0.9606 0.4520
LTR 0.0086 0.0320 0.1443 -0.1124 0.0131 -0.0416
SVAR 0.0025 0.0051 0.0558 0.0002 0.5412 0.0542
This table provides the summery statistics as well as the autoregression coecients of market excess re-
turns(MktRf) and several return predictors, including term spread (TS), default spread (DEF), trailing dividend-
to-price ratio of the S&P 500 (DP), trailing earning-to-price ratio of the S&P 500 (EP), Book to market ratio(BM),
long-term rate of bond return (LTR), and stock variance (SVAR). TS, EDF, DP, and EP data could be found
on Professor Robert Shiller's website; BM, LTR, and SVAR could be found on Professor Amit Goyal's website.
AC(1) and AC(12) denotes the autocorrelation coecient at lags of 1 and 12.
ket duration exhibit an upward trend before late 1990s and reverses after then.One
thing worth mentioning is that the market equity duration seems to be a lead indi-
cator of economic condition. For example, the market duration decreases before the
2008 nancial crisis and reversed before the recover of the recession. This empiri-
cal results shows the forward-looking information advantage of the equity duration
measure that utilizing analysis' forecast report data.
Figure 4.2 exhibits the growth and the shock of the market duration measure cal-
culating as equation (4.9) and (4.10). They appear to be stationary and correlated
with each other.
4.3.2 Idiosyncratic Volatility and Equity Duration
In this section, I investigate the relationship between the idiosyncratic volatility
of individual stocks and its equity duration. I apply a Fama-Macbeth analysis
controlling for common rm characteristics. The dependent variable is the idiosyn-
cratic volatility for each rm, and the independent variable are the implied equity
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FIGURE 4.1. Market Duration
This gure is the time-series plot of the S&P 500 equity duration from 1978 to 2012. The shaded area are the
period of economic depression identied by the NBER.
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FIGURE 4.2. Growth and Shocks of Market Duration
This gure is the time-series plot of the growth and shocks of value-weighted S&P 500 equity duration from 1978
to 2012. The shaded area are the period of economic depression identied by the NBER.
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duration and control variables, including stock price, total assets, institutional
ownership, age, book-to-market ratio, leverage (computed as liability divided by
total assets). The results are reported in Table 4.3 .
Consistent with the model, the coecient of the equity duration in Column (2)
is positively signicant with a p-value less than 0.05, showing that higher equity
duration is associated with higher rm idiosyncratic volatility. After adding the
interaction term between the equity duration and the indicator of low price rms
dened following Brandt et. al. (2009), I nd that the predict power of equity
duration are especially strong for the low price stocks.
We have seen that the a high implied equity duration is associate with higher
idiosyncratic volatility on individual stock level. Now I try to the answer a question
of whether this positive relationship can be extended to the market level as I
derived in the model section. I calculate the value weighted idiosyncratic volatility
of the market based on the CRSP stock data following Campbell et al. (2001). For
each month, I rst compute the rm-level stock idiosyncratic volatility for each
rm based on the Fama and French three-factor model and compute the value-
weighted market idiosyncratic volatility by their market share. I plot the log of
aggregate idiosyncratic volatility and our market duration measure log(Dursp500)
as in Figure 4.3.
The upper panel shows that time-series of the implied market duration, and
the bottom panel is the market idiosyncratic volatility. The two plot seems to
co-move pretty well between 1982 and 2007. They both peak at 1987, 1990, and
around 2000. During this period, there are positive trends for both series. The
result is consistent with our conjecture during this period. However, there are also
some conicts. For example, during 2008 to 2010, the two series seems to move
in opposite directions. The potential explanation is that the volatility could still
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TABLE 4.3. Determinates of Idiosyncratic Volatiltiy
(1) (2) (3)
price  0:0000  0:0000  0:0000
(0:0000) (0:0000) (0:0000)
leverage  0:0021  0:0017  0:0016
(0:0008) (0:0008) (0:0008)
d io  0:0040  0:0040  0:0032
(0:0011) (0:0011) (0:0010)
age  0:0001  0:0001  0:0001
(0:0000) (0:0000) (0:0000)
b/m  0:0009  0:0008  0:0008
(0:0002) (0:0002) (0:0002)
size  0:0031  0:0031  0:0028
(0:0001) (0:0001) (0:0001)
lag(idio) 0:4496 0:4447 0:4357
(0:0293) (0:0286) (0:0283)
IO  0:0031  0:0031 0:0023
(0:0007) (0:0006) (0:0005)
log(dur) 0:0018  0:0001
(0:0006) (0:0006)
Durlog(prc) 0:0027
(0:0002)
IOlog(prc)  0:0105
(0:0015)
This table reports Fama MacBeth ergerssion results. The dependment varialbe is rm-idiosyncratic volatility,
which is claculated following Campbell et al. (2001). The dependent variables are: prc denotes stock price. TLTA
is total liability devided by total assets. IO denotes the percentage of institutional ownership of the stock. d IO
is the change of IO form time t-1 to time t. Age is the rm age, which is dened as 1 as a rm rst showed on
the Compustat Database. BM denotes Book-to-market ratio and size is proxyed by market equity. LagIdio is the
idiosyncratic volatility of a rm on month t-1. LogDur is the our equity duration measure. Following Brandt et
al. (2009), I incorporate an interaction term between low stock price and other dependent variables. "Low price"
is dened as the stocks that have the 30% lowest price based on NYSE break point.
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FIGURE 4.3. Market Duration and Idiosyncratic Volatility
This gure exhibits the time-series plot of the value-weighted S&P 500 equity duration and the value weighted
idiosyncratic volatility from 1978 to 2012.
comes from shocks to cash ow. Focusing on large/high price stocks, I empirically
conrm the prediction of equation (2) and (3) with the associated R2 equal to 37%
and 77%. This means that the relationship between stock volatility and equity
duration could be nonlinear. The results also leave us at least 23% unexplained
variations in the stock volatility. Note that the connection between stock volatility
and duration could also change over time. I leave this potentially time-varying
relationship for future research.
4.3.3 Predictability Test
Equity duration plays as a multiple of the discount rate shock. Therefore, during
periods when the market equity duration is high, the shock of discount rate would
have higher impact to market returns volatility. In other words, investors should ask
for a higher premium for bearing the discount rate risk, which leads to a positive
relationship between equity duration and the market risk premium. In this section,
I explore the market return predictability of equity duration.
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Before I conduct a formal test to show the the relationship between market
excess return and the two duration predictors, I plot the time-series to justify the
idea as in Figure 4.4 and 4.5. The dark line in the gure denotes stands for the
excess market return over the 1-month T-bill rate across my sample period, and
the light line is the growth of market equity duration in Figure 4.4 and duration
shock in 4.5. Market returns appears to comove closely with both the duration
growth and shocks.
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FIGURE 4.4. Market Excess Return and Duration Growth
This gure exhibits the time-series plot of market excess returns (dark green) and market duration growth (dark
green). The shaded area are the period of economic depression identied by the NBER.
Following Fama and French (1989) and Li et al. (2011), I conduct the multi-
period forecasting regression as the equation (3.11).
KX
i=1
rmkt;t+i
K
= a+ b0Xt + et+k (4.11)
, where rmkt;t+i is the ex post market excess return at time t+ i, Xt is a vector of
predictor variables, b is a vector of slope coecients, et+k denotes the regression
residual, and K is the prediction horizon. To adjust for the serial correlation for
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FIGURE 4.5. Market Excess Returns and Duration Shocks
This gure exhibits the time-series plot of market excess returns (dark green) and market duration shocks (dark
green). The shaded area are the period of economic depression identied by the NBER.
the residual due to the use of overlapping observation, I use the standard errors
computed using GMM with the Newey-West correction and then compute the t-
statistics. I conduct the regression for 8 dierent horizons (1, 3, 6, 12, 24, 36, 48,
and 60 months).
Literature has uncovered that the predictive power of this regression is suered
form nite-sample biases (see. Stambaugh (1986), Richardson and Stock (1989) ,
and Richardson and Smith (1991)). To account for these biases, I use the boot-
strapping method to simulate the nite sample distribution of the t-statistics of the
regression slope under the null of no predictability as a bench mark of signicance.
Due to the use of overlapping data, the statistics of the regressions are correlated
across horizons. Therefore, I conduct the joint test across horizon by computing
the sum of the squared slope coecients across all horizons as the statistic to test
the null hypothesis that the slops are joint zero. The regression results are reported
in table 4.4 and 4.5.
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TABLE 4.4. In-sample Predictability using gdur;t as predictor
Without Control With control
Horizon b t(b) p R2adj b t(b) p R2adj
1 0:096 2:112 0:011 0:012 0:075 1:863 0:040 0:033
3 0:093 2:380 0:004 0:033 0:090 2:587 0:012 0:048
6 0:076 2:503 0:007 0:043 0:082 2:629 0:015 0:089
12 0:026 1:081 0:166 0:008 0:033 1:421 0:124 0:130
24  0:002  0:144 0:455  0:003 0:002 0:190 0:384 0:288
36  0:002  0:184 0:424  0:003  0:004  0:400 0:527 0:506
48  0:003  0:283 0:439  0:003  0:006  0:761 0:592 0:561
60  0:018  2:515 0:901 0:042  0:023  3:554 0:974 0:619P
b2 0:025 0:038 0:022 0:089
This table provides the results of the risk premium predictability using growth of market equity duration as a
predictor over dierent time horizons(1, 3, 6, 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 months. In the right panel (without control),
I use the growth of market equity duration as a single predictor. In the left panel(with control), I include DP, EP,
BM, TS, DEF, LTR, and SVAR as our control variables.
P
b2 computes the sum of squared slope coecents at
dierent horizons to test the null hypothesis that the slopes at dierent horizons are jointly zero.
TABLE 4.5. In-sample Predictability using Shockdur;t as predictor
Without Control With control
Horizon b t(b) p R2adj b t(b) p R2adj
1 0:097 2:306 0:015 0:011 0:060 1:513 0:067 0:030
3 0:105 3:099 0:005 0:042 0:099 3:011 0:009 0:053
6 0:103 3:826 0:002 0:079 0:104 3:552 0:005 0:115
12 0:063 2:988 0:009 0:057 0:063 2:887 0:019 0:167
24 0:009 0:680 0:236 0:000 0:010 0:860 0:238 0:291
36 0:008 0:957 0:190 0:001 0:001 0:098 0:434 0:505
48 0:013 1:714 0:075 0:012 0:007 0:966 0:232 0:561
60 0:005 0:750 0:171 0:000 0:000 0:065 0:438 0:554P
b2 0:035 0:007 0:028 0:035
This table provides the results of the risk premium predictability using shocks of market equity duration as a
predictor over dierent time horizons(1, 3, 6, 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 months. In the right panel (without control)
I use the shocks of market equity duration as a single predictor. In the left panel(with control) I include DP, EP,
BM, TS, DEF, LTR, and SVAR as our control variables.
P
b2 computes the sum of squared slope coecents at
dierent horizons to test the null hypothesis that the slopes at dierent horizons are jointly zero.
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Table 4.4 and 4.5 shows our results of predicting the ex post market risk premi-
ums using the implied equity duration factor. There are two versions of the model.
In the left panel, I use only the growth (shock) of the duration measure. In the right
panel, I further control for factors that are widely used in the return-predictability
literature (DP, EP, BM, TS, DEF, LTR, and SVAR). I see very strong predictive
power of the duration shocks to market premium over the horizon of 1, 3, 6, and
12 months. For example, the slope coecient of the left panel in Table 3.4 is 0.96
with a p-value of 0.11 for the 1-month horizon. The predictability lasts until the
12-month horizon. The results is robust after controlling for other factors as in the
right panel.
4.4 Summary
To explore the issue of the increased idiosyncratic volatility documented in Camp-
bell et al. (2001), I propose the implied market duration as an new explanation.
I show that stock volatility is positively related to the implied equity duration,
since equity duration plays a role of multiplier for the discount rate shock. In the
empirical study, I nd that the time-series of market equity duration and aggregate
idiosyncratic volatility co-move closely during the sample period as in Campbell
et al. (2001).
Since the interaction of equity duration and discount rate shock aect equity re-
turns, I explore the time-series predictability of the market duration to the ex-post
excess market risk premium. I nd strong evidence that shocks to the implied eq-
uity duration are informative in predicting ex post positive market excess returns.
However, there are still many unanswered questions that need more work. First
of all, in the model I decompose the discount rate shock into diversiable and
undiversiable terms. I still need more empirical work to see how each component
would aect stock volatility and asset pricing. Secondly, the although the trend of
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idiosyncratic volatility and the aggregate duration of S&P 500 co-move well before
2005, they move dierently in the later period, especially around 2008. Possible
explanation is that the cash ow shocks accounts more for idiosyncratic volatility
and therefore weaken the connection between volatility and cash ow. How the
shock of cash ow and the shock of discount rate would aect stock volatility aect
stock market could be conditional, which could be an interesting future research.
Third, Brandt et al. (2010) argues that the upward idiosyncratic volatility is due
to stocks with low price and high retail ownership. However, in my study, I focused
on high price and big rms. I need more work to reconcile the conict.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this dissertation, I wrote three essays on empirical asset pricing. In the rst
essay, I propose a holdings-based approach to re-examine the evidence on mutual
fund managers' illiquidity and volatility timing ability, which is unbiased from
the articial timing issue of the return-based timing measure. The holding-based
method uses only ex ante holding information on portfolio formation and, therefore,
does not suer from the articial timing bias. This holdings-based approach can
not only help us re-examine managers' illiquidity and volatility volatility skills,it
also allows as to know how important the articial biases plays a role in evaluating
managers' skill.
The second essay focuses on how managers' illiquidity and volatility reactions
reect their private incentives and how the reactions predict future fund perfor-
mance. I propose to construct new reaction measures by using the mutual fund
holdings data, which provides us direct information about managers' optimal asset
allocation. The new measure contains forward-looking information, which better
captures managers' investment decision. The new reaction measure allows us to
re-examine managers' illiquidity and volatility reactions, through which I can dis-
tinguish the economic motives behind those reaction behaviors.
The third essay try to solve the idiosyncratically puzzle in Campbell et al. (2001).
I propose a new explanation for to the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle based on the
cash ow horizon of stocks. I show that stock duration plays a role of a multiplier,
whose change amplies the shock of discount rate. I consider the dynamic of stock
duration as an alternative explanation for the upward trend through late 1990s.
49
Moreover, market equity duration explains the ups and downs of market idiosyn-
cratic volatility after year 2000, which makes the explanation more persuasive than
those in the literature.
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